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A B S T R A C T   
Bringing political ecology’s concern with the critical politics of nature and resource violence into dialogue with 
key debates in political geography, critical security studies and research on the geographies and phenomenology 
of violence and warfare, this paper explores strategies ‘from above’ in relation to the establishment and operation 
of the Rio Tinto QIT-Madagascar Minerals (QMM) ilmenite mine in southeast Madagascar. While QMM claims to 
be a responsible ‘green’ self-regulator and sustainable development actor, it has triggered serious social, envi-
ronmental and legal conflicts since its inception, including allegations of a ‘double land grab’ to accommodate 
mining activities and compensatory biodiversity offsetting. We argue that ‘pacification’, theorised as a pro-
ductive form of violence that works through the re-ordering of socio-nature, underwrites the forms of ‘security’, 
‘stability’ and even ‘sustainability’ that facilitate multiple and overlapping strategies of value extraction in the 
territorial and extra-territorial spaces occupied by the QMM mine partnership. By situating these dynamics 
historically, we identify ways in which pacification draws upon sedimented and evolving logics of racialised 
violence to facilitate operations and silence opposition.   
1. Introduction 
Contemporary dynamics of land and resource grabbing are neither 
‘wholly new, nor simply a replay of the past’ (Gilberthorpe & Rajak, 
2017, p. 188). The so-called ‘new scramble for Africa’ (Carmody, 2011) 
has clear precedents cycles of resource appropriation in the colonial 
period and in the 1980s and 1990s with structural adjustment and 
economic liberalisation (Scoones, Smalley, Hall, & Tsikata, 2018). As 
today, these cycles transformed landscapes, instituted models of primi-
tive accumulation and established patterns of dispossession and ‘wealth 
outflow’ (Bond, 2018, p. 89) alongside the continued existence of 
smallholder production regimes in different places. But in the early 21st 
century, there are new dynamics of resource control, strategies of 
accumulation and responses at play as a result of neoliberal 
globalisation. 
Recent work in political geography, political ecology, critical 
agrarian studies and related disciplines has highlighted ways in which 
shifting discourses and practices related to global environmental crisis, 
economic risk, security and sustainable development are associated with 
current waves of land reform, high rates of foreign direct investment and 
the securitization of natural resources (Borras, Hall, Scoones, White, & 
Wolford, 2011; Hall, 2011; Peluso & Lund, 2011; Scoones et al., 2018; 
Zoomers, 2010). The idea of a global ‘green economy’ has emerged as a 
powerful driver as well, re-framing a variety of overlapping economic 
and environmental crises associated with capitalism as opportunities for 
achieving ‘sustainable’ globalization and development based on ‘green’ 
growth (Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2017; Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014; 
McAfee, 2016). The green economy discourse on the low-cost economic 
‘fix’ for crises associated with environmental degradation, climate 
change and problems of resource efficiency has reshaped networks of 
power and authority around natural resource governance on a global 
scale (Dempsey & Suarez, 2016, p. 3; Fletcher, 2014; Mehta, Huff, & 
Allouche, 2019). 
These new drivers and politics of resource investment have given rise 
to new patterns and manifestations of resource acquisition alongside 
‘traditional’ forms of investment for agribusiness and extraction 
(Zoomers, 2010). New manifestations range from large-scale de-
velopments for food crop and biofuel production, market-driven nature 
conservation, large-scale infrastructure development and financial 
speculation (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Borras et al., 2011; Hall, 
2011). These developments include so-called ‘green grabs’, which 
involve territorial acquisition by governments and private investors that 
* Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: a.huff@ids.ac.uk (A. Huff), yvonne@orengo.co.uk (Y. Orengo).  
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Political Geography 
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102195 
Received 15 April 2019; Received in revised form 30 March 2020; Accepted 30 March 2020   
Political Geography 81 (2020) 102195
2
are legitimized and operate in the name of addressing, mitigating or 
‘repairing’ environmental problems such as global warming, land 
degradation and biodiversity loss (Corson & MacDonald, 2012; Dunlap 
& Fairhead, 2014; Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012; Lunstrum, 2014). 
In the name of ‘sustainability’, private conservation and environmental 
offsetting are increasingly used to ‘green-wash’ large-scale and envi-
ronmentally destructive resource investments (Bond, 2018; Castree, 
2008; Freslon & Cooney, 2018). 
A significant amount of scholarship has focused on these macro-scale 
drivers of resource grabs by states and corporate investors and their 
association with increasing inequalities in resource control at different 
scales (Borras & Franco, 2012; Burnod, Gingembre, & Andrianirina 
Ratsialonana, 2013). Likewise, an important body of work has high-
lighted diverse responses of people on the ground to these dynamics – 
contestation and resistance to dispossession and exclusion, but also re-
actions like acquiescence and incorporation in marginal or frontier 
resource geographies ‘where authorities, sovereignties, and hegemonies 
of the recent past have been or are currently being challenged by new 
enclosures, territorializations, and property regimes’ (Hall et al., 2015; 
Murray Li, 2014; Peluso & Lund, 2011, p. 668). 
However, in order to understand linkages between global drivers and 
the diverse mobilizations, movements and reactions ‘from below’, 
important questions remain about how new and intersecting politics of 
security and ‘green’ accumulation have shaped or altered reactions and 
strategies ‘from above’ – strategies and tactics that are used to achieve 
legitimacy, render responsibility, engineer consent and supress dissent – 
in the context of both traditional and new resource development settings 
(Brock & Dunlap, 2018; Geenen & Verweijen, 2017). How do elements 
and technologies of ‘past orders’, including logics and continuities of 
racism, ecological domination and war, travel through time, evolve, and 
get ‘refitted’ in contemporary institutions and practices (Rasmussen & 
Lund, 2018)? 
In this article, we explore these questions in relation to the estab-
lishment and operation of the QIT-Madagascar Minerals (QMM) 
ilmenite mine in southeast Madagascar. QMM is a unique public-private 
partnership between Rio Tinto subsidiary QIT-Fer et Titaine and the 
Malagasy government, one of the largest development projects in 
Madagascar and one of the largest and most controversial mining op-
erations in the world (Gerety, 2009). Despite QMM’s official claims of 
careful effort to attain ‘social license to operate’ through an extensive 
‘social engagement strategy’ (Rio Tinto, 2016), the mine has triggered a 
number of social, labour, livelihood-related, environmental and legal 
conflicts since its inception. While undeniably benefiting some, the 
operation has been condemned by many locals and international ac-
tivists as socially and environmentally unjust. QMM has been harshly 
criticized by Malagasy and international environmentalists and human 
rights activists for basic rights violations, exclusions and violence, and of 
executing a ‘double land grab’ – one for mining activities and one for 
spatially separate biodiversity offsetting – causing economic and phys-
ical displacement of Malagasy farmers, pastoralists and fishers (Kill & 
Franchi, 2016). Meanwhile researchers critique QMM for ‘green-
washing’, facilitated through Rio Tinto’s evolving corporate ‘net posi-
tive impact’ (NPI) strategy, as a means to achieve ‘managed 
dispossession’ (Kraemer, 2012, p. 266) whilst positioning the company 
as a responsible effective ‘green’ self-regulator and sustainable devel-
opment actor (see Seagle, 2012). 
Our analysis brings political ecology’s concern with the critical 
politics of nature and resource violence (cf. Brock & Dunlap, 2018; Le 
Billon, 2001; LeBillon & Duffy, 2018; Mass�e, Lunstrum, & Holterman, 
2017; Neumann, 2004; Peluso & Vandergeest, 2011; Watts & Peluso, 
2014) into dialogue with key debates in political geography, critical 
security studies and research on geographies of violence and war 
(Belcher, 2012; Gregory & Pred, 2013; Laurie & Shaw, 2018; Springer, 
2011; Springer & Le Billon, 2016; Tyner & Inwood, 2014; Tyner & Rice, 
2016). Using results of policy analysis, review of primary and secondary 
literature, and evidence from interviews and oral testimonies collected 
over nearly a decade of field research and local and international 
advocacy work in and on southern Madagascar, we argue for a 
re-formulated approach to ‘resource warfare’ that moves beyond and 
against dominant discourses on environmental security and ‘resource 
wars’. In particular, we explore how ‘pacification’, reconceptualised as a 
productive form of violence that works through the re-ordering of 
socio-nature, underwrites the forms of ‘security’, ‘stability’ and even 
‘sustainability’ that facilitate multiple and overlapping strategies of 
value extraction in the territorial and extra-territorial spaces occupied 
by the QMM mine partnership. 
We present this argument in five main sections. We begin the paper 
by highlighting contributions of political ecology in relation to key de-
bates in political geography, critical security studies and the political 
economy of resources, particularly in relation to resource conflict and 
how violence and technologies of security manifest through conserva-
tion and development initiatives. We also introduce a critical recon-
ceptualization of ‘pacification’, rooted in anti-security politics 
(Neocleous & Rigakos, 2011; Rigakos, 2011, 2016) and the phenome-
nology of violence (Baron et al., 2019), that frames our analysis. Next, 
we discuss historical trends and recent changes in Madagascar’s policy 
environment that have opened up the country to extractive investment 
and the liberalisation of nature. We then introduce the complicated 
spatiality and governance schemes of QMM in terms of overlapping 
‘zones of exclusion’ and explore tactics ‘from above’ through which the 
mine partnership obtains access to territory, political power and legiti-
macy to operate amidst local resistance and international criticism. 
Some strategies and tactics ‘from above’ have long histories, drawing on 
sedimented logics and practices of warfare. Thus, in order to understand 
what is ‘new’ about these dynamics, we then delve deeper to explore 
historical continuities and discontinuities in the ways value extraction 
has been engineered in Madagascar. We emphasize the significance of a 
racialised historical narrative of ecological insurgency that justifies 
political marginalization in linking past and present processes of 
enclosure and violence associated with engineering forms of value 
extraction. In conclusion, we reflect on the usefulness of a critical rec-
onceptualization of ‘resource warfare’, and the need for ongoing 
research into the coloniality and immanence of relational forms of 
violence in processes for securing and remaking the margins as frontiers 
of value accumulation. 
2. A note on the authors 
The co-authors of this article include a social anthropologist/politi-
cal ecologist with experience researching the contentious politics of 
environmental change in Madagascar and its local manifestations and 
effects in the south of the country (Huff) and the director of a small 
international NGO who has been deeply involved in international 
activism and community advocacy around the QMM case (Orengo). 
Each of us has over a decade of experience in our respective areas, with 
some important overlaps in terms of participation in campaigns advo-
cating for recognition of local claims. The analysis that we present in this 
article is based on sources of evidence and documentation that reflect 
and draw together our different backgrounds and expertise. In addition, 
because of our respective ethical commitments, professional and per-
sonal experiences in Madagascar and internationally, we are not neutral 
observers and we do not claim ‘distance’ in relation to the case at hand. 
3. Political ecology, critical geography and security 
With close ties to critical geography, development studies and social 
anthropology, political ecology emerged from a radical critique of 
apolitical approaches to environmental and development research and 
practice (Adger et al., 2001; Le Billon, 2001, p. 563). Over time, through 
increasing focus on questions around the construction of, access to and 
control of natural resources, its research scope has differentiated and 
broadened to engage with the intertwined structural, social and 
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environmental dimensions of power relations, processes of environ-
mental change, nature-based accumulation and justice struggles at 
different scales. Because of this, research in political ecology often in-
tersects in important ways with debates in political geography, critical 
geopolitics, security studies and the political economy of natural re-
sources. Political ecologists have used fine-grained critical analyses that 
combine tools of ethnography, policy analysis, institutional, historical 
and archival research to demonstrate ways in which ostensibly ‘local’ 
dynamics of environmental change, conflict and people’s struggles 
articulate and enmesh with ‘global’ politics and material processes. 
Particular attention has focused on questions around the reconfiguration 
of socio-natural relationships and socio-spatial power, involving 
changing discourses, technical and material processes and institutional 
practices and relations (Le Billon, 2007, p. 170). 
A hallmark of political ecology – shared with other critical social 
sciences – is its attention to the role of power relations in historical 
processes of social construction and, consequently, epistemological 
scepticism toward universalist, reductive and ‘categorical’ approaches 
to knowledge (Castree & Braun, 1998; Cronon, 1996). Whose interests, 
values and worldviews are reflected in authoritative discourses and 
representations of ‘nature’, ‘resources’, ‘development’ and ‘sustainabil-
ity’? Who is silenced, excluded, marginalized, or harmed (Death, 2014, 
p. 9)? This orientation has guided a great deal of critical engagement 
with work on environmental security and resource conflicts, challenging 
neo-Malthusian narratives around resource conflict and so-called 
‘resource wars’, and moving beyond questions of the ‘resource curse’ 
and causal relationships between conflict and resource scarcity or 
abundance (Bond, 2014; Collier & Hoeffler, 2005; Grossman & Men-
doza, 2000; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Humphreys, Sachs, & Stiglitz, 2007; 
Ross, 2013). 
Rather, political ecology’s approach can open up these broader de-
bates to questions about how resources are made regulatable objects of 
accumulation, how governance is shaped by evolving constellations of 
power and authority and how power is expressed, exercised and chal-
lenged in efforts to stabilize and sustain what Watts and Peluso (2014) 
describe as the ‘resource complex’. As a result, political ecology can 
contribute to a clearer understanding of the social and scalar complexity 
of resource conflicts, as not only rooted in changing resource access due 
to contemporary processes of privatisation and enclosure but also as 
emerging from historical struggles and changing regimes of truth and 
accumulation that shape colonial and capitalist imaginaries of nature, 
society, resource users and development (LeBillon & Duffy, 2018; Watts 
& Peluso, 2014, p. 196). 
3.1. Environmental security, resource warfare and counterinsurgency 
Through the 1990s, the post-Cold War ‘broadening of the security 
agenda’ extended and normalized security logics across a number of 
domains by linking these issues to military concerns and framing them 
as ‘equivalent to military problems’ (Floyd, 2008, p. 54). In environ-
mental policy, it extended to issues around control of people’s re-
lationships with the environment and natural resources (Dalby, 1992, 
2002; 2003; Eriksson, 1999; Homer-Dixon & Levy, 1995; Ney, 1999; 
Wæver, 1993). Issues around wildlife, land, water, forests, mineral re-
sources and processes of environmental change were reconceptualised 
in terms of ‘environmental security’, as threats to national, international 
or even global peace and social, political and economic stability (Bar-
nett, 2001; Eriksson, 1999; Huff, 2017; Rothschild, 1995, pp. 53–98; 
Trombetta, 2006, 2010). In the words of Duffield (2011: 7–8), ‘ … war, 
economy and nature collapse into a single problematic of security, 
whether natural or man-made they become one and the same thing; a 
threat now likened to a military attack’. The contested notion of envi-
ronmental security has evolved to encompass a range of positions that 
draw on neo-Malthusian assumptions about human-environment re-
lationships and view resource scarcity and degradation as a driver 
‘environmental conflict’ (Barnett, 2001, 2003; Barnett & Adger, 2007; 
Duffy, 2016; Floyd, 2008; Matthew, 1995; Ney, 1999). 
The rise of environmental security discourse is associated with the 
turn toward explicit incorporation of the language and operational 
logics of warfare in conservation and resource development (Duffy, 
2016; Neumann, 2004). By the early 2000s, researchers had begun to 
recognize how the material demands and practices associated with 
so-called ‘new’ modalities of warfare and securitization were influ-
encing patterns and intensity of resource exploitation and the state of the 
environment (Kaldor, 2013; Le Billon, 2001; Peluso & Watts, 2001). On 
the flip side, war was becoming a ‘common model and metaphor’ 
associated with environmental conservation and natural resource 
claims, particularly in the global south (Neumann, 2004). Tapping in to 
a deep seated fear of ‘the poor’ and their claims on resources and space, 
early work on this new dimension of ‘resource war’ associated its nor-
malisation with an emerging ‘moral geography’ wherein force, in the 
forms of coercion, dispossession and other forms of violence, was 
justified and expressed through techniques of territorial and social 
control and in the subjugation of people’s rights and livelihoods to 
concerns of ‘security’ (Neumann, 2004, p. 813). 
More recently, researchers have proposed new frameworks for 
thinking through how the language, logics and rationalities of warfare 
have entered into conservation and development practice. Work on 
‘green militarization’ (Lombard, 2016; Lunstrum, 2014), ‘green secu-
rity’ (Kelly & Ybarra, 2016) and ‘war by conservation’ (Duffy, 2016) has 
explored ‘hard’, ‘direct’ or ‘kinetic’ forms of militarization and violence 
associated with intensifying securitization of protected areas, 
anti-poaching campaigns (Mass�e, Gardiner et al., 2017) as well as con-
servation in war zones (Marijnen & Verweijen, 2016). Others have 
emphasized the importance of considering the spatial and temporal 
dynamics of forms of slow or ‘attritional’ violence and neglect that can 
underlie ‘explosive and spectacular’ episodes in conservation and 
extractive settings (Cliggett, 2014; Huff, 2017; Nixon, 2011, p. 2; Witter 
& Satterfield, 2018). Taking into account long histories of struggle 
around cycles of penetration, violence and neglect that can characterise 
‘marginal’ places, Huff (2017: 3) has suggested that new trends in 
resource grabs for biodiversity conservation and industrial value 
extraction can in some instances be likened a ‘siege phase’ in a pro-
longed war of attrition for control of resource frontiers. 
Bringing insights from this work into dialogue with critical military 
studies has introduced considerations of the environment and environ-
mental governance more fully into debates around the ‘security-devel-
opment nexus’ (Duffield, 2010, 2011). It has also given broader insight 
into the ways in which the logics of security, war and capital accumu-
lation are co-instituted in everyday life and inscribed in landscape 
through violent and militarized conservation and development practices 
(Masse, 2017; Mass�e, Lunstrum, et al., 2017). To these ends, the political 
ecology of (corporate) counterinsurgency (COIN) in particular has 
emerged as an important analytic lens that broadens the notions of 
conflict and war-making and deepens methodological approaches to 
understanding the manufacturing of consent and coercion around con-
servation and extractive developments (Brock & Dunlap, 2018; Dunlap, 
2019; Anderson, 2011; Parenti, 2011). 
So-called ‘conventional’ warfare seeks to control territory and 
destroy the military power of an opponent (Parenti, 2011). Drawing on 
French and US military theory (there are varied national counterinsur-
gency ‘traditions’), counterinsurgency, or COIN is a varied and adaptive 
form of ‘internal’, ‘asymmetrical’ or ‘irregular’ warfare in which polit-
ical, economic and psychological tactics of waging a ‘population-centric’ 
war are preferred, but deployed alongside, military violence (Anderson, 
2011; Belcher, 2012; FM3-24, 2014; Galula, 2002). Prior work in the 
political ecology of COIN has explored the historical roles of insurgency 
and counterinsurgency warfare in the construction of state territories 
and ‘national natures’ (Peluso & Vandergeest, 2011; Ybarra, 2012). 
Brock and Dunlap (2018: 34) identify corporate COIN as comprising the 
actions taken by firms ‘to mitigate violence and promote stability 
through social development and security measures with a primary 
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objective to “win hearts and minds” of local populations’. COIN – as a 
tactical constellation – is deployed to legitimise extractive operations, 
achieve tacit political control over populations and resources and un-
dermine capacity for resistance to enclosure and corporate penetration. 
Whether the objective is military or corporate control of space, COIN 
is intended to work at the ‘capillary’ level of social relations within a 
population (Parenti, 2015, p. 47). It creates ‘ruptures’ and tears in the 
social fabric that separate ‘friend’ from ‘enemy’ and allow society to be 
controlled through these divisions (Belcher, 2012). As such, COIN pri-
oritizes practices such as the creation of territorial security, provision of 
physical infrastructure, and establishment of social and economic 
development programs, distribution of aid, establishment of schools, 
and other tactics meant to win loyalty whilst propaganda campaigns and 
fostering networks of trust and patronage seek to isolate or undermine 
political opposition and co-opt of members of the political class. At the 
same time, surveillance, military measures and threat of force are 
important means of disciplining populations, coercing cooperation and 
enforcing social divides (see Brigham, 1968 quoted in Dunlap, this issue; 
FM 3–24, 2014). 
3.2. Pacification and geographies of violence in ‘engineering’ extraction 
This growing body of work has particular resonance with the 
unfolding research agenda on geographies of violence that calls for 
greater sensitivity to forms, expressions, relationality and processual 
dimensions of violence and the mutual constitution of violence and 
space (Blomley, 2003; Gregory & Pred, 2013; Laurie & Shaw, 2018; 
Springer & Le Billon, 2016; Tyner & Inwood, 2014). It has contributed to 
a clearer conceptual understanding of how different forms of violence 
and technologies of security manifest through development initiatives 
(Tyner & Rice, 2016; Verweijen & Marijnen, 2018; Ybarra, 2012). In 
turn, this offers insight into how ‘imaginative geographies’ (Springer, 
2011, p. 90) and technologies of neoliberalism associated with devel-
opment, sustainability and warfare gain traction and can interact to 
co-construct legitimacy and validity in the context of emplaced and 
often violent struggles for territory and resources. 
Attempts to control land and people are often violent and the use of 
military tactics to secure elite and foreign claims to control of territory, 
wildlife and other resources has a long and bloody history in sub- 
Saharan Africa, even when it has not been framed in terms of ‘war’ 
(Duffy, 2016; Gregory & Pred, 2013; Ybarra, 2012). As Rasmussen and 
Lund (2018) contend, ‘[c]onfrontations, ranging from evictions to 
genocide, have signposted the deployment of overwhelming political 
power to open up frontiers, from colonial conquests that destroyed and 
transformed indigenous rights systems, to the contemporary expropri-
ation of genomes’. The instruments, and, by extension, the manifesta-
tions and effects of violence, are shaped by the forms of power that 
operate them. Violent geographies are ‘disparate, protean and varie-
gated’ as its manifestations can be ‘exceptional’ and spectacular or 
invisible and insidious (Springer, 2012, p. 136). 
In military doctrine and in much research on COIN, the terms 
‘pacification’ and ‘counterinsurgency’ are often used interchangeably 
(see for example Belcher, 2012; Brock & Dunlap, 2018; Dunlap, 2019; 
FM3-24, 2006, 2014; Galli�eni, 1900a, 1900b; Galula, 2002, 2006). But 
work in Anti-security politics (Manolov & Rigakos, 2014; Neocleous, 
2011, 2013), critical pacification theory (Rigakos, McMullan, Johnson, 
& €Ozcan, 2009; 2016) and the phenomenology of violence (Baron et al., 
2019) offer intriguing and radical re-conceptualizations of pacification 
that set it apart from common usage and from COIN. Anti-security and 
critical pacification theorists consider pacification, defined as the need 
to ‘secure insecurity’, as fundamental to the social – and, we argue, 
socio-natural – relations of capitalist modernity, and aim to enact a 
radical, critical and transdisciplinary politics to ‘displace the ubiquity 
and reach’ of the liberal security discourse (Neocleous, Rigakos, & Wall, 
2013; Neocleous & Rigakos, 2011; Rigakos, 2011, p. 63). 
Drawing on anarchist and postcolonial thought, Baron et al. (2019: 
5), see pacification as an invisible security architecture that operates as a 
naturalized and internalized regime of compulsion or domination. While 
direct forms of violence correspond to ‘compulsory power’ and indirect 
violence to ‘institutional and structural power’, pacification, though 
‘backed’ through the exercise of other forms of violence, operates pri-
marily through ‘productive power’ and produces the elements of liberal 
‘peace’ and ‘stability’ – securing the insecurity – that is so necessary to 
the contemporary world order. It follows that structures of order create 
and expand spaces and sites of pacification, not limited to spaces of 
‘liberal capitalism, colonialism and the postcolonial aftermath’ (Baron 
et al., 2019, p. 6). Resonating with anti-security’s notion of ‘securing 
insecurity’ discussed above, they suggest that ‘the hallmark of pacifi-
cation is that the structures of domination ensure that resistance in the 
form of direct violence against this order is less frequent’. In other 
words, episodes of ‘spectacular’ violence reveal breakdowns or weak-
nesses in pacification’s security architecture, or situations in which 
pacification operates on a terrain that may always exceed its capacity. 
This foregrounding of pacification is particularly important to our 
analysis because it emphasises the centrality of histories of domination – 
of both nature and of society – in shaping contemporary security ar-
chitectures as well as terrains of struggle (Neocleous & Rigakos, 2011, p. 
18). Rigakos (2016: 27) theorizes pacification as a stratified and his-
torical process, involving dispossession, exploitation and commodifica-
tion, that reflects capital’s need to create productive territories and to 
‘permanently discipline’ people into their role as labourers and subjects 
conducive to exploitation. This is important for three main reasons. 
First, relevant to questions of territorialisation and dispossession 
associated with conservation and extractive development, this calls for 
bringing in consideration of the geographic and political margins, not as 
empty or ungoverned spaces in need of taming, civilization or ‘devel-
opment’, but as they have been historically produced. This requires 
recognition that margins are spaces that comprise both complex socio- 
natural relationships involving diverse actors and also ‘stacked claims’ 
(Hunsberger et al., 2017, p. 314), which exist in a state of institutional 
superposition which can lend a tense ambiguity to state-society relations 
(Graeber, 2007), and which are produced ‘in between’ and also in 
relation to the enclaves that have been secured through globalization 
(Ferguson, 2005, p. 379). 
Second, centring history means centring logics of domination that 
justify and naturalize exploitation and violence. This includes the ways 
that racism figures in the construction of the ‘other’ – the production and 
projection of ‘insurgency’ – that creates and normalizes the risk, fear, 
danger and urgency – the sense of insecurity – by which ‘securitization’ 
is made to appear socially necessary. Othering isolates those whose 
rights, dignity or lives are inconvenient or who refuse the forms of 
development, sensibilisation or modernization offered to them, justifying 
disregard and neglect (Andreucci & Kallis, 2017, p. 96; Springer, 2011). 
Third, turning to ‘nature’, we introduced the idea above that paci-
fication is fundamental to enabling the socio-natural relations of capi-
talist modernity. Because of the evolution of environmental security and 
pacification’s objective of creating ‘productive territories’ as well as 
subjects, pacification should not just be relevant to understanding the 
role of violence in re-ordering relationships between individuals and 
social institutions. It should also be relevant to understanding technol-
ogies that re-order ‘nature’– the material, biological, political, socio- 
cultural and affective relationships among people and things that are 
not people. This is an area where bringing political ecologists’ work on 
conservation and the neoliberalization and marketization of nature into 
dialogue with work on the phenomenology and geographies of violence 
is particularly insightful and relevant. 
In recent years, policy responses to mounting crises of climate 
change, ecological degradation, economic volatility and growing 
inequality based in neoclassical economics and market environmen-
talism have involved coordinated action to create a global ‘green 
economy’ based on ‘green’ growth, in part involving the use of market- 
based instruments to economically value, account for and trade ‘natural 
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capital’ and ‘ecosystem services’ (Sullivan, 2009). The logic behind 
‘nature marketization’ is that making nature ‘visible’ in GDP will 
incentivise private resource management, and ultimately fund the con-
servation and ‘repair’ of biodiversity, the atmosphere and other 
life-supporting aspects of nature (Fairhead et al., 2012; Fletcher, 
Dressler, Anderson, & Büscher, 2018). 
Offsetting is a sub-set of techniques, practices and assumptions that 
mirror broader trends in the marketization and commodification of 
nature. Following the ideas of Baron et al. (2019) and Rigakos (2016) 
introduced above, offsetting can be seen as a technology of pacification 
that capitalizes on rupture and disruption – both environmental 
disruption caused by industrialization and forms of dispossession – and 
acts through the productive re-working of relationships between people, 
institutions and non-human nature in order to transform damaged, 
threatened or unproductive nature into economically productive terri-
tory. Rather than producing commodities by growing crops or extracting 
minerals, offsetting introduces forms of surveillance and accounting, 
metrological regimes and commercial principles, into the management, 
valuation and social life of a landscape. Just as pacification ‘secures the 
insecurity’ in ways that can maintain or strengthen structures of social 
domination, offsetting ‘secures the insecurity’ of environmental changes 
by producing and performing the forms of ‘sustainability’ that facilitate 
continued industrial growth. 
As with traditional protected areas, advocates of offsetting rely on 
the moral authority of mainstream Northern environmentalism to 
invisibilize violence, and particularly violent dispossession of rural 
populations. Backed by the institutional and structural power of states, 
international organizations and private sector partners, land-based off-
setting likewise involves the transfer and formalization of property and/ 
or resource management rights to investors, NGOs, environmental 
agencies or other recognized beneficiaries. In conventional conservation 
settings, dispossession is often justified through narratives of threat, 
degradation and the need for outside intervention for the sake of pres-
ervation (Huff, 2011; Huff, 2017, p. 6; Kull, 2002a, 2002b). Offsetting is 
different in that it operates on the productive principles of ‘repair’ and 
‘restoration’ of nature rather than that of preservation. For offsetting to 
occur there must be the assumption from the outset that, within a 
delineated area, environmental degradation has occurred or will occur 
or progress without external intervention to prevent it. As an environ-
mental mitigation technique, creating an offset involves undertaking 
‘additional environmentally beneficial activity’ in one place ‘in order to 
compensate for known environmental damage elsewhere’ (Lovell, 2018, 
p. 223; Mahanty, Milne, Dressler, & Filer, 2012; Lohmann, 2012). 
Political ecologists and critical geographers have pinpointed a vari-
ety of social and technical ‘hazards’ arising around the changes associ-
ated environmental offsetting (Awung & Marchant, 2017; Bennett & 
Dearden, 2014; Dooley & Gupta, 2017; MacKenzie, 2009; McAfee, 2012, 
2014; Pelletier, G�elinas, & Skutsch, 2016; Peluso & Lund, 2011). 
Demonstrating additionality requires that some sort of quantifiable 
environmental benefit must be demonstrated above an assessed ‘base-
line’ level of degradation. This is often done through restricting the use 
of resources at the local level or removing politically marginalized 
people from an area of protection, restoration or rehabilitation. Because 
of the changes in law and local resource governance required in 
offset-producing conservation or restoration projects, offsetting can 
permanently reconfigure forms of resource access, gender roles and la-
bour institutions, customary governance institutions and the distribu-
tion of wealth and property within a population in complex, and often 
detrimental ways (Awung & Marchant, 2017; Pelletier et al., 2016). As 
in other forms of exclusionary conservation, these restrictions are 
frequently enforced through militarized measures, including fencing, 
surveillance and direct force, and by the criminalization of livelihoods. 
Private conservation and offsetting are increasingly intertwined with 
the expansion and intensification of extractive activities in resource-rich 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and are associated with contestation, 
resistance and conflict in local resource settings (Bond, 2018; Castree, 
2008; Freslon & Cooney, 2018). Through policy initiatives, industry 
standards, corporate directives and marketing strategies, offsetting al-
lows even the most polluting or ecologically destructive industries to 
‘greenwash’ operations, or claim that they have ‘neutralised’ or even 
reversed forms environmental harm, such as carbon emissions, land 
degradation or biodiversity loss (Chiapello, 2015; Lohmann, 2012; 
Lovell, 2018; Mahanty et al., 2012). This allows industrial actors to 
appear responsive to, and thus less in need of, environmental critique, or 
even position themselves as industry leaders in ‘sustainability’ (Huff & 
Brock, 2017; Mol & Spaargaren, 2000). 
4. From contested margins to green investment frontier 
Since at least the pre-colonial dynastic period in the 16th century, 
and through successive regimes of rule, forests have occupied an 
ambiguous space in the elite imaginary of Madagascar, as simultaneous 
value reserves and as potential threats to order. Forest residence and 
shifting cultivation were rightly seen by pre-colonial elites not only as 
integral to peasant autonomy and livelihoods, but also as means of 
resisting authority and extra-local control (Kull, 2002b; Raik, 2007). 
Mirroring processes of enclosure of the commons in Europe in the early 
nineteenth century (Perelman, 2001, 2007), Merina King Andria-
nampoinimerina (1745–1810) banned the cutting of live firewood, 
declared all of Madagascar’s forests to be royal property and allegedly 
forbade people from congregating in forests to ‘forge clandestinely arms’ 
lest they ‘prepare a rebellion’ (Raik, 2007, pp. 5–6). 
This act of enclosure rendered forests as ‘national space’ and estab-
lished the foundation for the systematic marginalization of forest-based 
communities in Madagascar by ‘the state’ in various iterations (Watts 
and Peluso, 2014). This was followed by increasingly exclusionary 
legislation in the mid-nineteenth century that criminalized forest set-
tlement, forest-based cultivation and landscape burning, which is used 
to this day by smallholders to manage woodlands, prepare fields, control 
pests, and manage wildfires, but also in acts of protest and resistance 
(Kull, 2002b; Raik, 2007). 
These policies are important as they strengthened and drew legiti-
macy from a set of powerful narratives that drew linkages between ideas 
about race, political legitimacy and environmental change in the pre- 
colonial period in Madagascar and are written into the founding justi-
fication of the Malagasy state itself.1 In regard to race and political 
legitimacy, these are associated with the intertwining of territorial 
struggles between competing pre-colonial dynasties, endogenous caste 
divisions and hierarchical notions of racial difference that travelled with 
European intellectuals and missionaries to the royal halls of Imerina in 
the pre-colonial period. The London Missionary Society (LMS) in 
particular played a pivotal role in cementing the power base of the 
ostensibly ‘racially’ superior Merina monarchy based in the central 
highlands in the pre-colonial period, and in heightening tensions be-
tween Merina and others (often simply called cotiers) between the 1860s 
through the 1890s. Significantly, these dynamics shaped the lens 
through which Malagasy society and political hierarchies were 
1 The sixteenth through nineteenth centuries comprised a period of cultural, 
political, and economic transformation on Madagascar as polities across the 
island vied for territory, control of resources and trade with English, French, 
Arab, Dutch and Portuguese interests. State formation in Madagascar can be 
traced to a period of roughly fifty years between 1780 and 1830 when the 
political structure of Imerina in the central highlands region (currently Anta-
nananrivo Province) shifted from relatively small, lineage-governed polities to 
become centralized under a single ruling lineage that controlled a formal army, 
trade, agricultural production, and institutions governing labor conscription 
over large swaths of the island. These particular historical developments were 
intimately linked to imperialist competition, especially between the British and 
French, as well as to the ability of favored Merina bureaucrats to manipulate 
both foreign policy and local political symbols and institutions to their 
advantage. 
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interpreted and presented in the first transcribed and translated oral 
histories of the highlands (Corson, 2016, p. 35). These later became the 
basis for hegemonic ‘official’ histories of Madagascar as a whole. 
The linkage of ideas of race and state legitimacy to understandings of 
environmental change relates to a parallel set of ideas shaping ‘official’ 
histories and intersecting with the governance trends described above. 
These include an emerging, flawed, yet powerful understanding of the 
social-natural history of Madagascar popularized by traveling European 
naturalists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to 
this story, prior to recent2 human settlement, dense forests filled with 
fantastic creatures covered the entire island of Madagascar, but have 
been subsequently lost to cutting, burning and erosion driven by an 
impoverished, irrational, destructive and rapidly growing peasantry 
(Huff, 2012, 2017; Salmona et al., 2017; also see; Humbert, 1927; Per-
rier de la Bâthie, 1921; Raik, 2007). In the French colonial period, this 
‘degradation myth’ (Kull, 2002a) led to the institutionalisation of an 
authoritative narrative of environmental insecurity in which race, class, 
gender and environment-society relations intersect. This narrative in 
part legitimized continuing forest enclosure, forced labor, biological 
warfare and other brutalities under French rule (Jarosz, 2003; Kauf-
mann, 2001; Middleton, 1999). Rakotondrabe (1993) associates these 
dynamics with dominant political discourses in Madagascar that 
continue to justify vast disparities in power and wealth across Malagasy 
peoples and geographic regions today. 
In this ‘ecological sitzkrieg’ (‘slow war’) narrative, which continues to 
be a strong influence in contemporary environmental and development 
policy, elite forms of value embodied in Malagasy forests, lands and soils 
are framed as under progressive assault from rural subsistence farmers 
and mobile pastoralists (Diamond, 1989; Huff, 2017). Malagasy peas-
ants are represented as latecomers to the island, often in terms of 
invoking the language and imagery of invasive species, imposing 
themselves on fragile ecologies, resistant to rule, armed with primitive 
and dangerous productive technologies like fire, swidden horticulture 
and arguably more dangerous capacities for biological reproduction 
(Huff, 2017, p. 6; Kull, 2002a). Malagasy cotiers, whose livelihoods 
variably involve transhumant cattle grazing and forest browsing, 
small-scale forest extraction, shifting cultivation and periodic burning to 
clear small fields for subsistence production and to prepare pasture for 
livestock, are presented as a primary threat to forests, soils and by 
extension national economic development. 
As in many parts of the world, the ‘undeveloped’ rural margins of 
Madagascar have become re-fashioned as frontiers of economic growth 
and ‘sustainable’ development in recent decades. This has happened 
through the restructuring of the Malagasy state in relation to economic 
production since the 1980s, and the institutionalisation of mechanisms 
of economic liberalisation – privatisation, deregulation and decentrali-
sation – formalised in a series of synergistic legislative reform processes 
implemented since the 1990s. These included key sectoral reforms that 
pinned national aspirations of economic growth firmly to investor- 
driven natural resource exploitation through any means. 
Sectoral reforms included the National Environmental Action Plan 
(NEAP), revisions to the Malagasy Mining Code, and implementation of 
the National Land Tenure Programme (see Huff, 2016). The reform 
process also involved cross-sectoral legislation such as the Framework 
for Environmentally Compatible Investments (Mise en Compatibilit�e des 
Investissements avec l’Environnement, or MECIE Decree) and the Invest-
ment Law. While the former is an environmental mainstreaming 
mechanism to align investments with conservation priorities, the latter 
opened up foreign investors’ access to land through purchase or per-
petual lease (Huff, 2016). These and other reforms have had profound 
implications for opening up Malagasy lands and resources to foreign 
investors whilst complicating governance in three primary ways. 
First, multi-sector reforms have accelerated liberalisation, which 
decentralised and extended state bureaucracy through the proliferation 
of new quasi-private agencies. This has exacerbated jurisdictional 
confusion resulting from legal pluralism in the Malagasy land sector 
(Evers, 2013; Pronk & Evers, 2007) and the mining sector (Huff, 2016). 
Paradoxically, despite bureaucratic growth, waves of structural adjust-
ment have been so successful in hollowing out state institutions that the 
government is often unable to implement even liberal legislation 
without substantial external funding and technical support (Sarrasin, 
2006, p. 395). Second, and in parallel, since the early 2000s there has 
been an intensification of interest and investment in land and mineral 
resources by multinational corporations. The extractive sector has 
become the largest driver of national economic growth and in recent 
years multinational mining companies have made the largest foreign 
investments in Madagascar’s history. 
Third, through the implementation of the NEAP and establishment of 
the System of Protected Areas of Madagascar (Syst�eme d’Aires Prot�eg�ees 
de Madagascar, or SAPM), Madagascar essentially created a new sector, 
‘the environment’, and liberalized ‘nature’ (defined in terms of forests 
and biodiversity) by opening it to investors interested in revenue from 
activities like private conservation, ecotourism or pharmaceutical 
research (Huff, 2016). Madagascar’s goal to expand extent of its 
terrestrial protected areas, a project at first referred to as President Mark 
Ravalomanana’s ‘Durban Vision’ and that later became the SAPM, was 
meant to align Madagascar’s national protected area strategy with the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) target that a 
country needs to protect 10% of each of its major biomes (Corson, 2012). 
The spatial extent of Madagascar’s protected areas (PAs) quadrupled 
rapidly, from 47 sites covering about 1.7 million hectares (ha) in 2003 to 
122 sites covering 7.1 million ha in 2016 (Gardner et al., 2018). Due to 
poor capacity, the government resorted to promoting private and NGO 
management of PAs in addition to direct management and 
co-management. 
Along with liberalizing policy reforms, a strong rhetoric on de-
mocracy, sustainable development, community-led conservation, and 
protecting the rights of poor and forest-dependent communities has 
infused high-level policy discourse in Madagascar in recent years. Even 
though up to eighty per cent of Malagasy people live in rural areas and 
are engaged in self-subsistence farming and pastoralism, rural Malagasy 
continue to have little power to influence forest and land policy, control 
resources and have little legal protection in the face of large-scale in-
vestment (Neimark & Schroeder, 2009). Likewise, micro-lending, agri-
cultural commercialization programs and ‘alternative’ livelihood 
projects promise development to people who, often abruptly, find live-
lihoods criminalized or lose access to land and forest resources when a 
protected area is established, or when a mining or agricultural lease is 
granted. 
Conservation and extraction are considered as complementary and 
cognate pathways for economic development in Madagascar. In fact, 
there is notable spatial and strategic overlap between the two, as new 
mining concessions are often granted near or contiguous to the bound-
aries and buffer zones of national parks and reserves or are accommo-
dated by redrawing protected area boundaries (Cardiff & 
Andriamanalina, 2007; Huff, 2012). The implementation of the SAPM in 
particular involved the accommodation of mining interests in the 
boundary mapping and zoning on new protected areas (Corson, 2011). 
Malagasy law does not mandate that environmentally destructive 
mining operations establish biodiversity offsetting programs, but 
biodiversity offsetting is required for Madagascar’s inclusion in the 
Extractive Industry Trade Initiative (EITI) and has thus been adopted in 
the past few years by operators across the country to varying degrees, 
including Rio Tinto/QMM, Base Resources, World Titanium Resources, 
Ambatovy, Wisco, Guanomad, Exxonmobil and others (USAID, 2014). 
This results in the creation of new private conservation areas under 
2 Even though the timing of permanent human settlement of Madagascar 
remains debated by researchers, Madagascar has long been acknowledged as 
among the last major landmasses on Earth to be permanently settled by humans 
(Hansford et al., 2018). 
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corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSR) directives or 
the transfer of funds to support the enforcement of PAs that already 
existed on paper but were not effectively enforced due to capacity 
constraints. These processes have thus ‘opened up’ natural resource 
governance to new powerful and often overlapping alliances and claims. 
This means that large-scale resource investments have unprecedented 
power to shape politics and life. 
5. The socio-industrial geography of QMM 
We now turn to the QMM case, which we present in a way that 
emphasises the complicated territorial and extra-territorial spatiality of 
the mining operation. To do this, we conceptualize the ‘resource envi-
ronment’ (Fig. 1) in which QMM operates in terms of three primary but 
‘overlapping zones of exclusion’ (Davidov, 2014, p. 33; K€ak€onen & 
Thuon, 2018, p. 2). We do this in order to highlight how forms of tactical 
violence and technologies of pacification work across the landscape of 
the operation. As we will explore in detail below, QMM’s concessions 
comprise what we describe as ‘territorially fixed’ spaces for mining, 
conservation and environmental rehabilitation, ‘non-territorial regula-
tory spaces’ formed by technical practices (K€ak€onen & Thuon, 2018, p. 
2) associated with compensatory biodiversity offsetting, and what we 
introduce as non-territorial pacified development spaces formed 
through corporate social technologies (Rogers, 2012) operating through 
the institution of so-called ‘development gifts’. 
QIT Madagascar Minerals (QMM) is a large-scale mineral sands 
project in one of the materially poorest and most ecologically sensitive 
parts of Madagascar. Since the mid-eighties QMM has been jointly 
owned as part of a public-private partnership (PPP) between the Mala-
gasy government, which owns twenty per cent of the company, and QIT 
Fer et Titane, a Canadian subsidiary of Rio Tinto, which owns eighty per 
cent (Rio Tinto, 2015). Starting in 1986, QMM undertook exploration 
along the east coast of Madagascar searching for heavy mineral sands. 
Following nearly twenty years of research and exploration, large, viable 
ore deposits were found in the Anosy region of Madagascar near Fort 
Dauphin at the sites of Mandena, Sainte Luce, and Petriky. Locally called 
fasy mainty (‘black sands’), they contain naturally occurring titanium 
dioxide in the form of ilmenite and rutile which is mined, exported and 
refined into a stark white pigment used to colour consumer goods from 
paint to toothpaste (Vincelette, Dean, & Ganzhorn, 2007). 
5.1. Territorially fixed spaces of extraction, conservation and exclusion 
QMM completed an environmental and social impact assessment 
(ESIA) in 2001 and received legal license to begin operations in 2005. In 
this same year, the Malagasy Government agreed to contribute US $35 
million from a World Bank Integrated Growth Poles project for the 
construction of urban infrastructure in Fort Dauphin and the new Ehoala 
Port to facilitate QMM’s local operations and exports (Seagle, 2013). 
The three mine sites, located at Mandena, Sainte Luce, and Petriky, are 
set to be mined sequentially using active dredge mining under a 
100-year lease from the Malagasy government (Gerety, 2009; Rio Tinto, 
2014; Seagle, 2009, 2012, 2013). 
Located just north-east of Fort Dauphin on one of the most well- 
maintained roads in the country, the fenced and guarded Mandena 
extraction site comprises approximately 2000 ha. Of this, 230 ha are set 
aside for the Mandena conservation area, promoted as a ‘biodiversity 
gene bank’ for future restoration activities in the area and further 
advertised by QMM as a destination for ecotourism (Seagle, 2009). 
Similar conservation areas were allocated at the not-yet-active Sainte 
Luce and Petriky mine sites, and conservation areas at all three sites 
have since been designated as IUCN Category 5 Protected Areas by the 
Government of Madagascar and incorporated into the SAPM (Rio Tinto, 
2016). 
Against the backdrop of a spectacular public relations strategy ori-
ented around claims of social, environmental and development benefits 
for the region, QMM began operations in 2005 with infrastructure 
development, securing leases and, backed by the government’s threat of 
force, removing local smallholders from approximately 6000 ha (23 
square miles) of territory in rural southeast Madagascar for mining, port 
construction and private conservation areas. During the port construc-
tion phase alone, hundreds of villagers were displaced from their homes, 
their land forcibly taken under the government’s land acquisition pro-
cess called Declaration of Public Utility (D�eclaration d’Utilit�e Publique, or 
DUP) to make way for the mine. QMM documented that 498 ‘Project 
Affected Persons’, or PAPs, lost land, housing, fishing and agricultural 
production due to expropriation for the mining project (International 
Advisory Panel, 2011). They were rehoused without land of equal value, 
against World Bank regulations (Harbinson, 2007a; Seagle, 2013). Many 
reported receiving a fraction of the compensation promised to them, in a 
process that lacked transparency and that did not reflect the current or 
intergenerational value of the land lost. Uncompensated people were 
instead invited to participate in new livelihoods projects that have been 
driven by ‘sustainability’ and public relations agendas directed by QMM 
(Seagle, 2012). All of this has caused serious tension in the region and 
widespread resentment against the mining company. 
Active extraction at the first site, Mandena, began in 2009, and mine 
managers contend that at peak capacity it could produce as much as two 
million tonnes of unrefined ilmenite ore, worth about USD 200 million 
per year, to be exported for processing abroad (Seagle, 2013). Despite 
QMM claims that they have paid out almost USD 4 million in compen-
sation to people who were negatively impacted by the Mandena mine, 
by December 2009 there were reportedly 563 outstanding complaints 
about compensation lodged with QMM (International Advisory Panel, 
2011). People complained of inadequate or zero compensation for loss 
of land, crops and fishing, accompanied by allegations of fraudulent 
accounting. Resettled families complained about the very poor quality of 
Fig. 1. The QMM resource environment in south-eastern Madagascar. Illus-
tration by Tim Zocco, 2019. 
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the housing, which needed frequent repair. Unfulfilled demands resul-
ted in continuing protests in January 2010, including roadblocks on 
access roads to the mine. The then Provincial Governor (Chef de R�egion) 
was keen for the failed compensation process to be investigated but this 
was impossible as the paper trail of payments and receipts had 
disappeared. 
In addition to the direct effects of mine establishment, including 
forced evictions and exclusions through DUP processes, 344 Antanosy 
fishermen had their livelihoods and safety affected due to construction 
of a breakwater for the new port. These fishermen were not consulted 
when QMM selected the port location and were displaced from tradi-
tional boat launching sites. The new site that they were expected to use 
was unacceptable because it was very dangerous. Boats were destroyed 
and significant income was lost since fishers could not launch boats in 
bad weather from the new site. The fishermen fell outside the formal 
Malagasy DUP process that was applied to compensate displaced and 
resettled families classified as PAPs, so they were initially overlooked 
and excluded from recompense for their livelihood losses; their case was 
regarded subsequently only after disruptive public protests. 
The imposition of a ‘dina’, an ostensibly ‘customary’ form of contract 
that has been redesigned and set up to control locals’ access to the 
Mandena conservation area, resulted in criminalization and fines for 
forest-dependent people faced with the choice between prohibited 
extraction of forest resources or going without food. Some locals say 
they have lost out to conservation areas, not only due to loss of access 
but also because these ostensibly ‘community-based’ arrangements 
place an additional management demand on them with insufficient 
remuneration (Harbinson, 2007b, p. 14). 
QMM has seen a succession of protests and general strikes since 
mining at the Mandena site went live in 2009. Hundreds of Malagasy 
people from around the region have been involved in resisting evictions 
and involuntary relocation; seeking compensation and reparations for 
lost lands and livelihoods; protesting environmental despoliation; 
opposing the destruction of sacred forests and unauthorized removal of 
ancestral tombs; mobilizing against exclusion from ancestral forestlands 
and denouncing loss of forest access. 
In 2010, inspired by oral testimonies collected through a collabora-
tion between the UK-based NGO Andrew Lees Trust (ALT-UK)3 and 
Panos London, UK-based human rights lawyer Leigh Day assisted one 
thousand villagers to bring a class action lawsuit against Rio Tinto 
(Curtis, 2016). However, the company capitalized on legal delays and 
the fragility of the situation and made quick cash offers directly to over 
half the Malagasy claimants. Villagers who were offered payments were 
understandably more ready to have money in hand than await outcomes 
of an uncertain process happening thousands of miles away that was 
difficult for them to see, follow and understand. QMM thus managed to 
neutralize the class action lawsuit; with under half of the claimants 
remaining, Leigh Day was forced to suspend it. As in the initial 
compensation process, there was a lack of transparency about how these 
sums were calculated and a lack of a payment accounting trail. 
From 2011 through 2013, a variety of domestic and international 
NGOs and researchers offered recommendations to rectify QMM’s 
flawed compensation and communications activities, but this advice 
was ignored. A particularly large protest occurred in January of 2013, in 
which hundreds of lightly armed protestors, many of whom had expe-
rienced eviction from lands now controlled by the mines, blocked roads 
and trapped employees (including the chief of Malagasy operations) in 
the mining site. After the company threatened to withdraw from all 
operations in Madagascar, the protest was eventually put down through 
military force (Seagle, 2013). 
New protests have erupted since 2016 following additional land 
acquisitions in Mandena. Locals report that leases were once again sold 
below their value, at just 500 Malagasy Ariary per square metre (about 
USD 0.15 at the time), against the State Commission approved 3000 
Malagasy Ariary per square metre (about USD 0.88). The sales were 
coupled with the enticement of secure land tenure in the future, when 
the plots would be formally titled and returned by QMM to the prior 
owners after mining. However, in addition to inadequate compensation, 
no consideration was given to short- and medium-term livelihoods and 
food security issues, despite the obvious dependence on natural re-
sources for subsistence by rural people in this region. In 2018, locals 
took to the streets to protest and blocked access roads to the mine site. 
QMM’s response was to take legal action resulting in the imprisonment 
of protestors (CRAAD-OI & TANY, 2018). 
5.2. Extra-territorial regulatory spaces: compensatory biodiversity 
offsetting and exclusionary control of liberalized nature 
The QMM operation is not simply a mine; among its many activities 
it involves areas set aside as private conservation areas, ecological 
rehabilitation areas and biodiversity offsetting sites. QMM uses a 
compensatory offsetting model in which damage to biodiversity caused 
by the mining activities is ostensibly neutralised through technical 
measures that link spatially distant conservation and mining areas, but 
also enmesh local, national and international actors and organizations, 
public and private spheres and governance across economic sectors. 
At the International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) 
World Conservation Congress in Bangkok in 2004, representatives of Rio 
Tinto historically announced that it ‘aims to have a net positive impact 
on biodiversity by minimising the negative impacts of its activities and 
by making appropriate contributions to conservation in the regions in 
which it operates’ (Turner, 2014). This is the central selling point behind 
Rio Tinto’s claims to be a pioneer of so-called ‘sustainable mining’ 
(Seagle, 2012). Rio Tinto’s cumulative global strategy, which has since 
been scaled back from a ‘corporate-wide commitment’ to ‘allowing sites 
to tackle their own contexts on a case-by-case basis’ (Rio Tinto, 2017), 
uses the ‘Net-Positive Impact’, or NPI, offsetting methodology for 
demonstrating additionality, which the company claims involves a 
number of methods meant to ensure that the company’s activities result 
in a higher degree of positive than negative environmental impact in the 
places where their mines are located. 
Acquired through an agreement with the National Office of the 
Environment (Office national pour l’environnement, or ONE) and 
geographically separate from the mine sites, the company created, 
biodiversity offsetting sites totaling an approximately 6000 additional 
ha at Sainte Luce, Mahabo and Bemangidy (part of the Tsitongambarika 
Forest Complex, or TGK III). These sites are likewise designated as 
protected areas. While financially supported by QMM to realize its 
corporate ‘Net-Positive Impact’ biodiversity strategy, they are admin-
istered by the government and NGO partners under a variety of ar-
rangements (Kill & Franchi, 2016; Rio Tinto, 2016). They are also 
supported by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN), which entered a formal partnership with Rio Tinto in 2010 after 
nearly ten years of less formal cooperation (IUCN, 2019). 
Local and broader concerns about environmental impacts of extrac-
tion and the loss of biodiversity in this fragile setting have been coun-
tered with erroneous or misleading claims that the nearly 6000 ha of 
littoral rainforest facing clearcutting in mining zones would vanish 
anyway within twenty years due to ‘tavy’ (slash and burn agriculture) 
and unsustainable use of forest products (Seagle, 2013, p. 1). Company 
literature and scientific articles (authored by paid consultants of QMM) 
on the environmental impacts of the operation and the importance of its 
conservation activities reproduce a generalized degradation narrative 
3 This extensive collection of oral testimonies, collected among people who 
have been directly and indirectly impacted by the establishment of the QMM 
mine, by the mine itself or through loss of land or forest access, is titled 
Madagascar Voices of Change: Oral testimony of the Antanosy people (published by 
the Andrew Lees Trust & PANOS London, 2009). It is free and available for 
download at: http://andrewleestrust.org/Reports/Voices%20of%20Change. 
pdf. 
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(see Huff, 2012, 2017) that attributes loss of forests, biodiversity, and 
agricultural productivity to the poverty, population growth and irra-
tional subsistence practices of rural Malagasy peasants. For example, 
according to Rio Tinto (2014), ‘the Anosy region has experienced sig-
nificant deforestation since at least the 1950s due to charcoal production 
and unsustainable slash-and burn-cultivation’. Vincelette et al. (2007: 3) 
write that ‘[m]ost of the rural population … relies on forest resources 
during times of food shortage but also year-round for fire- and con-
struction wood. This led to the destruction of a substantial proportion of 
the littoral forest ecosystems over the last 50 years’. 
According to Seagle (2013: 2), this historically produced discourse of 
alterity positions ‘local land users as the “environmental Other” – 
ecologically destructive, trapped in the past, isolated from markets, and 
in need of being trained (through Rio Tinto/QMM’s development 
apparatus) to be more sustainable’. This literature suggests that ‘back-
ground rates’ of forest loss and general degradation eclipse the mine’s 
impacts and can, in fact, be reversed through its NPI offsetting approach. 
In addition to conservation and rehabilitation activities at mining sites, 
QMM claims to be ‘investing in biodiversity offsets at several forest sites 
in the region, with the aim of reducing high background rates of 
deforestation’ (Rio Tinto, 2014). 
Methods for achieving NPI can be controversial due to the risk of 
social, ethical, and technical hazards, even among advocates of market- 
based conservation (Bull, Lloyd, & Strange, 2017; Gardner et al., 2013). 
NPI methods often involve a combination of strategies of compensatory 
offsetting and conservation in the ‘repair’ mode (Huff & Brock, 2017). In 
extractive settings, NPI methods can involve creating protected areas in 
one place to compensate, through substitution, for biodiversity that has 
been destroyed in a separate mining site. This is carried out through a 
form of marketization in which target areas undergo a quantified pro-
cess of abstraction to create standardized units that can be ‘substituted’ 
across time and space on balance sheets (Bakker, 2005). The rendering 
of substitutability is combined with methods that ‘demonstrate’ pre-
vention of ‘future losses’, usually through a combination, as in this case, 
of eviction of human residents, restricting access to resources, or Pay-
ments for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes that pay members of local 
communities to forego use of particular resources or to carry out 
particular conservation and/or restoration activities. Spatial offsetting, 
through ostensibly preventing assumed future loss in one area at a 
calculated rate that exceeds destruction in another area beyond a set 
cumulative ‘baseline’, allows a company to claim that their activities 
enhance biodiversity or other ecosystem services – thus achieving 
‘Net-Positive Impact’ – regardless of the actual destruction wrought at 
the mining site (Anstee, 2008; WBCSD, 2015). 
QMM’s claims to NPI are highly problematic. Not only do offsetting 
sites involve different types of forest than have been destroyed by the 
mine (‘out-of-kind’ offsetting), but they draw conclusions about ‘back-
ground rates’ of deforestation based on a flawed methodology that treats 
rates of forest cover change as uniform or constant over time and space 
when in reality ‘rates’ of forest cover change are very specific in both 
time and space. By Rio Tinto’s own admission, the Tsitongambarika 
Forest Complex (the focal area for offsetting, comprising three forest 
sections called TGK I, TGK II and TGK III): 
… does not experience some of the same pressures as other forests in 
Madagascar; there is almost no charcoal making and little exploitation for 
timber (at least not in the east). In general, fuelwood is harvested around 
the villages and charcoal is produced mainly from the dry forests and 
plantation stands. As a result, there is little degradation—forest is either 
pristine or has been cleared entirely for tavy. 
Olsen, Bishop, & Antsee, 2011, p. 9 
High ‘baseline’ calculations for the TGK presented by QMM are in 
fact generalizations based on averages of deforestation rates assessed in 
different places, at different time spans and across a very large and 
differentiated region in terms of actual drivers and amounts of forest 
cover change (Olsen et al., 2011). Alarmingly, the Bemangidy biodi-
versity offset area (TGK III) discussed below was described in a report by 
QMM’s own researchers (Olsen et al., 2011, p. 5) as in ‘very good con-
dition’, showing ‘few signs of human disturbance except for small areas 
of clearing along the edges,’ at the time that the protected area was 
established. This would indicate that, at the time of the assessment, it 
was not under threat of deforestation by the people who depended on it 
for food and other forest products. 
Despite company claims to equity, consultation and concern for 
locally suitable alternative livelihoods, the implementation of QMM’s 
biodiversity-offset programme has been plagued with massive failures 
and has exacerbated suffering among affected populations living far 
from the mining activities being offset. These failures are particularly 
related to how achieving NPI has been approached in QMM’s biodi-
versity offsetting strategy, which has been implemented with the sup-
port of Asity, a local NGO operating as a subsidiary of Birdlife 
International. 
For example, villagers living in Antsotso and impacted by biodiver-
sity offsetting at Bemangidy in the Tsitongambarika Forest Complex 
(TGK III) report that QMM did not explain to them that they were 
involved in a corporate offsetting program when they were asked to 
participate in tree planting and were excluded from accessing the forest, 
measures intended to mitigate for biodiversity loss where Rio Tinto are 
actively dredging for ilmenite (Kill & Franchi, 2016). Constrained 
resource access due to the biodiversity offsetting measures has seriously 
impacted food security among Antsotso’s residents, forcing them to 
abandon rich fields near forest areas and instead grow manioc in inferior 
sandy soil next to the sea at great distance from their village. 
These changes have reduced locals’ production capacity to a level 
insufficient to maintain subsistence, and people are suffering from 
hunger. At a public meeting convened by the National Office of the 
Environment (ONE) in the village in 2017,4 concerned residents were 
told by ONE that they could expect no compensation for their losses 
because the offset was part of a national conservation programme, a 
state driven initiative in which QMM were only partners. In other words, 
ONE’s expressed position (echoed in conversations with QMM em-
ployees as in mid-2018) was that residents’ claims to compensation had 
no basis because their livelihood activities were illegal in the first place, 
and further, regardless of company actions or profits resulting from 
offsetting, QMM had no responsibility nor culpability in the situation. 
At the same time, ONE, in separating out its conservation re-
sponsibilities from the impacts of the offsetting program, told villagers 
they would have to talk to QMM about their problems, directing them 
towards co-operation with the company and away from contestation 
about land and forest rights. Taking advantage of jurisdictional confu-
sion associated with the public-private partnership, QMM has thus been 
able to advance projects for residents on its own terms, such as bee 
keeping and pepper growing, that do not adequately replace the com-
munity’s subsistence losses, while villagers’ actual demands to QMM for 
assistance (submitted formally to QMM in January 2018) (ALT-UK, 
2018) have been ignored. 
5.3. Pacified development spaces: Rio Tinto’s ‘development gifts’ 
QMM has gained and maintained an extremely high level of political 
control in Anosy, despite resistance, with the promise of the gifts of 
development. QMM claims that it has a careful consultation process 
involving members of local populations, and has aimed at building what 
they call ‘community ownership’ on the basis of the idea that ‘benefits 
and tangible results will influence more significantly the trust between 
4 From transcripts of a meeting between ONE convened and members of the 
Antsotso community on 6 October 2017, which was recorded by local NGO 
Trano Aro Zo (TAZ) at the request of Antsotso residents. For further information, 
see http://www.andrewleestrust.org/blog/?p¼530. 
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QMM and its host communities’ (Rio Tinto, 2016, p. 26). Along these 
lines, QMM claims to have worked to address poverty in the Anosy re-
gion by promoting sustainable fisheries, distributing seeds and advo-
cating for the local production of rice, manioc, yams, livestock and 
handicrafts. The company claims local development gains through 
infrastructure improvement and through partnering with civil society 
organizations on projects focused on job creation and community-based 
health programmes. 
The Social Engagement Program has also involved educational ini-
tiatives, including the launch of the Rio Tinto Scholarship Program for 
Education (RISE) in partnership with NGO Pact Madagascar, develop-
ment of ‘support courses’ in partnership with local schools and a youth 
leadership training program (Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, 
2015). Partnerships with other service providers such as the health 
service of the District (SDD), WaterAid Madagascar, ASOS, and several 
UN agencies including UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO have provided trainings 
in health and sanitation (Mining Health Initiative, 2013). With the Of-
fice of the High Commissioner Human Rights, QMM claims to have 
delivered trainings on international humanitarian principles and human 
rights to Malagasy police and military (Rio Tinto, 2018). It claims the 
successful and equitable resettlement of households and replacement of 
livelihoods unavoidably disrupted by mine-related activities (Rio Tinto, 
2016). 
A number of international research, environmental and development 
organizations support QMM’s biodiversity offsetting approach. Other 
partners include Malagasy and international universities, research in-
stitutes, civil society organizations, and high-profile organizations such 
as Bird Life International, the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), 
Conservation International (CI), Flora and Fauna International, Kew 
Botanical Gardens, Missouri Botanical Gardens and USAID (Kill & 
Franchi, 2016; Rio Tinto, 2016). Rio Tinto’s partner organizations praise 
the company’s scientific approach to biodiversity offsetting and portray 
the company as an ethical, ‘model’ mining company that goes above and 
beyond legal requirements for addressing social and environmental is-
sues (Seagle, 2009, p. 15). 
QMM’s claims of ‘social license to operate’ gained through diligent 
local consultation, local development benefits, the empowerment of 
local populations and ecological improvement, reported to media or in 
glossy brochures, seem to issue from and resonate primarily with out-
siders, unfamiliar with the local context and with little comprehension 
or attention to local perspectives, histories, desires, experiences and 
politics. QMM’s Social Engagement Program has proved not to be in 
good faith, as evidenced by the fact that consultation and compensation 
processes are woefully insufficient to address losses to livelihoods and 
resource access. Communication has been ‘flawed’ (even by the com-
pany’s own admission5), and the company has failed to include 
marginalized members of local populations or those with specific live-
lihood interests (e.g. coastal fishermen) when making strategic social 
and technical decisions (Andrew Lees Trust & PANOS, 2009; Kraemer, 
2012; Seagle, 2012; Smith, Shepherd, & Dorward, 2012). 
While promises of local jobs and enhanced economic opportunities 
held much opposition at bay ahead of mining permissions being granted, 
early promises of local skills training and employment have gone un-
fulfilled, with the majority of jobs going to educated and already skilled 
outsiders from the national capital or to foreign contractors. Widely 
perceived unfairness in QMM’s hiring practices led Antanosy workers to 
join a campaign against Rio Tinto through an international union 
movement (Industriall, 2015). Furthermore, from the start-up phase in 
2005, the cost of living increased in the regional capital, Fort Dauphin, 
and food and house rental prices spiked with the arrival of mine workers 
from other regions and abroad (Harbinson, 2007a). Coupled with 
increased cost of living, the failure to provide promised, long-term local 
employment over the following decade has created a profound sense of 
frustration and disappointment and has been central to repeated com-
plaints and protest actions and has been the cause of deep resentment 
towards QMM and a loss of initial trust in the company. 
In July of 2018, a high level QMM staff member was overheard in 
public by one of the co-authors of this article dismissing local grievances 
with the company by complaining that Antanosy people ‘just don’t want 
the gifts of development we can offer’. But QMM’s development ‘gifts’ to 
the region are self-serving. For example, the RISE program’s scholar-
ships have provided bursaries for 800 students but resulted in the 
closure of an important grassroots educational training centre, Centre 
Ecologique Libanona, developed by Malagasy academics and adminis-
trators over more than two decades to deliver higher education oppor-
tunities and university accredited programmes in the region. The centre 
had historical associations with international groups and researchers 
who had contested the mine and its disappearance. Its closing is repre-
sentative of wider suppression of local symbols, linkages or networks of 
independent enquiry and resistance. 
QMM claims to have improved regional health services, promoted 
HIV/AIDS awareness and to have promoted respect for human rights 
and children. However, it has never clarified whether funding for these 
trainings was actually provided by QMM or the agencies involved 
(although services ‘in kind’ rather than direct funding have long been a 
preferred approach by QMM). The company claims responsibility for 
electrification, infrastructure improvement, water and sanitation, and 
urban beautification but much of the cost of this has been supported by 
government development funding from the World Bank’s Integrated 
Growth Poles programme. Moreover, these services and infrastructural 
improvements are only widely accessible within the small city of Fort 
Dauphin. The city itself has become a sort of international development 
enclave town, full of educational programs, social clubs, amenities and 
luxuries enjoyed by social elites, government employees, aid workers, 
company contractors, international NGO volunteers and foreign holiday 
makers but bears little resemblance to the surrounding region or most of 
the country. 
6. Historical continuities in engineering extraction 
It makes sense to view QMM through the lens of landscape as it is not 
simply ‘a mine’ in practice. A landscape is always changing, and at any 
moment can represent a mixture of geological and ecological processes, 
land uses, institutions and ‘stacked claims’ in superposition (Hunsberger 
et al., 2017, p. 314). The terroir of extraction in southeast Madagascar 
has come about due to a number of intersecting circumstances: historical 
violence and class-based exclusions; regional geology and the distribu-
tion of sub-surface minerals; regional biogeography; deep histories of 
landscape use that have patterned the extent and location of forest areas, 
PAs and rural settlements and livelihoods; liberal policy reforms; mo-
dalities of imperialism, including the rise in prominence of the ‘green 
economy’ discourse; the territorial expansion of Madagascar’s system of 
protected areas (SAPM) and QMM’s conscious decision to integrate its 
operation into the ‘long-term regional development plan’ rather than 
establishing ‘an enclave industry’ (Rio Tinto, 2016, p. 11). QMM’s 
spatiality is characterised by the intersection of different, socially 
exclusionary control schemes and conflicts. This spatiality – the dy-
namics, or production, of this landscape – can be more fully understood 
in terms of pacification lens than through conventional sectoral ap-
proaches to governance or critical engagements with counterinsurgency 
theory alone. 
‘Official’ history has been an incredibly powerful instrument of 
governance since its formalization in the nineteenth century and con-
tinues to play a major role and in policy discussions today. The creation 
of the ‘nation’ cannot be separated from the normalisation of racial and 
class-based hierarchy, nor from the historical construction of the ‘po-
litical forest’ outlined by Peluso and Vandergeest (2011), where – real or 
5 A Rio Tinto executive conceded this in 2012 during a discussion on QMM 
communications during meetings with the 2011–2013 NGO Liaison Committee 
to Rio Tinto, UK. 
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imagined – members of a subversive and dangerous sub-class were seen 
as both threats to the property of the state and insurgents against the 
civilizing project associated with state-making. Influenced by degrada-
tion myths and the deep Euro-American cultural salience of 
neo-Malthusian ideas, the framing of materially poor, rural Malagasy 
people as intruders and environmental destroyers has become institu-
tionalized and continues to be reinforced in scientific and popular nar-
ratives of environmental change in Madagascar. These range from 
Diamond’s (1989) highly problematic use of the ‘sitzkrieg’ metaphor 
equating human settlement of Madagascar to both a violent invasion and 
a war of attrition accomplished through ‘massive destruction of habitat’ 
and species extinction (see critique Huff, 2017) to popular media de-
pictions of the country with ‘a pierced heart’ (Draper, 2010), its ‘red 
earth bleeding into the sea’ (Morrell, 1999, p. 63), a ‘microcosm for the 
end of times’ (Allen, 2015). 
Under French colonial rule (1896–1960) these representations 
legitimized the establishment of the first generation of restrictive pro-
tected areas in Madagascar and a series of decrees that placed strict 
restrictions on forest-based livelihoods. As Kull (2002b: 2) observes, 
resistance to domination in rural Madagascar has hardly been a simple 
matter of peasant mobilization and protest, but instead is often a much 
more subtle praxis and ‘multifaceted livelihood-oriented strategy that 
grows out of the political-ecological context as well as out of the con-
tradictions inherent in state domination’. Rural populations, lifeways 
and even landscapes resistant to rule were thus viewed by colonial au-
thorities as undisciplined and ungovernable and inherently threatening 
to the primary goal of value extraction, tangled into a state of ‘conjoined 
human and ecological disposability’ warranting suppression through 
any means (Nixon, 2011, p. 4). 
In recent years, many researchers and journalists have taken up the 
discourse that the past thirty years or so represents an era of ‘new’ wars 
involving ‘low-intensity conflicts’ and ‘irregular’ or ‘asymmetric’ war-
fare, including counterinsurgency (Kaldor, 2013; see discussion in; 
Winter 2011, p. 489). However, while there have been important 
changes, particularly in battlefield and surveillance tech, so-called ‘new’ 
forms of warfare have deep roots in European and American colonial 
and post-colonial projects of post-conquest pacification, ‘consolidation’ 
and territorialisation (Cassidy, 2006; Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014; Fergu-
son, 2014; Lackman, 2006; Peluso & Vandergeest, 2011; Ybarra, 2012). 
The apparent doctrinal renaissance of counterinsurgency in the US, for 
example, has drawn heavily on the particular work of David Galula 
(2002; 2006), a French officer and writer who served in Algeria in the 
late 1950s and conceptualized COIN primarily as a form of 
counter-revolutionary warfare. Galula’s works, however, took many 
‘theoretical lessons for granted that had been distilled from more than a 
century of practice’ in the context of French colonization (Rid, 2010, p. 
728). This glossing obscures the histories of experimentation with forms 
of environmental and biological warfare alongside social technologies 
and ‘pacification’ tactics used in broader colonial campaigns aimed at 
consolidation of control over people and territory. This includes 
refinement of tactics that, by the end of nineteenth century French 
colonial operations in Madagascar, gave rise to a mature, multifaceted 
and transformative French counterinsurgency doctrine (Rid, 2010, p. 
731). 
In Madagascar, producing the colony involved deployment of social 
technologies to establish inclusionary control, but also force to subdue 
and exclude both active and tacit resistance to colonial territorial 
expansion, labour exploitation and value extraction. Pioneered in the 
French colonization of Madagascar, the Tache d’huile (‘oil-spot’) or 
Gallieni-Lyautey Method, was implemented and refined under Military 
Governor, and later Governor General Joseph Gallieni (1896–1905) and 
his prot�eg�ee Hubert Lyautey (1897–1902). Tache d’huile favored a ‘light- 
handed’ ‘psychological’ approach that privileged political action over 
direct military intervention to isolate opposition and achieve progres-
sive territorial control (Betts, 2005, pp. 115–116; Venier, 1991). Under 
this policy, the French adapted colonial administration to local 
institutions thus fostering indirect rule and instituting a characteristic 
colonial bureaucracy. French forces selectively armed frontier villages 
to divide rural populations and used ‘creeping’ progressive occupation 
through establishing successive frontier military outposts. Using local 
collaboration and development ‘gifts’ alongside an ever-present threat 
of forced labor, imprisonment or worse were all important means of 
establishing dominance and politically neutralizing ‘unusable’ local el-
ements at the ground level (Griffin, 2009). 
As well as justifying such social rupture in the service of producing 
and reproducing colonial authority during progressing occupation, the 
othering narrative of cotier ‘insurgency’, broadly applied to Malagasy 
peasants and their social ecologies, was taken up and weaponized in 
efforts to transform the island into productive territory. In this process, 
‘exceptional’ violence – violence that would normally be viewed by 
society as an abhorrent violation of the rules – was transformed into 
‘exemplary’ violence – the violence that makes the rule (Springer, 2012). 
For people who declined the ‘gifts’ of colonization, this legitimized a 
brutal regime of suppression through police and military force – the 
criminalization of livelihoods, property seizure, razing of villages, 
forced labor, forced settlement and worse. This resonates with the 
reflection of, following Mbemb�e’s (2003: 40) reflection on the colony 
itself as a frontier space ‘where the violence of the state of exception is 
deemed to operate in the service of “civilization”’ (see also Cavanagh & 
Himmelfarb, 2014, p. 3). 
In a stunning example of this sort of brutality, in 1899 then-Governor 
General Gallieìni, became concerned that the vast unconquered south of 
the country risked becoming a center of rebellion. The south was 
inhabited by mobile pastoralists who generally expressed little desire to 
be part of the colony and had created an extensive pastoral ecology and 
independent economy based around prickly pear cactus (various species 
of the genus Opuntia, introduced in the 1700s, and called Raketa in 
Malagasy). At Galli�eni’s order, cochineal insects, a cactus parasite, were 
shipped to the south and released. The parasite devoured raketa at great 
speed, ushering in a killing famine as they spread across the country 
destroying pastoralists’ preferred species that were the basis of the 
indigenous cattle complex, used for fencing, cattle fodder and human 
food. The famine devastated whole regions, causing demographic 
displacement and killing tens of thousands – if not millions – of Malagasy 
people and their livestock (Kaufmann, 2000, 2001). During the antico-
lonial rebellion of 1947, an estimated 100,000 Malagasy were executed, 
tortured, starved, or driven into the forest to later die of starvation or at 
the hands of French forces and collaborators (Cole, 2001). 
Through ‘official’ history, the logics of exemplary violence and 
resource warfare have travelled and co-evolved with Malagasy state 
institutions from the pre-colonial period to the present day. This has 
normalized the exercise of forms of exemplary violence that are widely 
associated today with engineering value extraction, securing the mar-
gins and producing frontiers ‘from above’ – dispossession through large- 
scale resource enclosure, the criminalization of livelihoods, property 
seizure, forced settlement and resettlement, exploitation through denial 
of human rights and forced labor, as acceptable for the ‘greater good’. In 
the QMM case, pacification operates as and through means of securing 
the insecurity of the margins. Corporate counterinsurgency tactics have 
created ruptures in society and socio-natural relationships, meant to 
achieve ‘inclusionary’ control over populations and resources and un-
dermine capacity for resistance by consensually integrating people into 
a hierarchical power system in which conflicts could be efficiently 
managed and pathways of resistance could be better hidden or dis-
incentivized (Cohen, 1991, p. 221; Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014). 
But pacification remakes the development space, re-ordering social 
life and nature to align with the preferences and expectations of poli-
cymakers, market actors and shareholders. It brings acceptable and 
more manageable forms of order to what, from above, are viewed or 
framed as otherwise insecure, undeveloped, ungoverned and unpro-
ductive spaces of threatening self-reliance (Duffield, 2010; Hanssen, 
Rouwette, & van Katwijk, 2009). QMM has capitalized on existing forms 
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of discrimination and stereotypes associated with the historical narra-
tive of environmental insurgency to create a justification for green 
grabbing and, at the same time, has capitalized on having a useful foil, a 
vast category of underpowered people to blame when company strate-
gies do not work or go wrong. 
QMM has used this ‘othering’, working with and through local and 
national partners, to close down political space for public contestation 
and de-legitimise claims to damages or compensation. This is pacifica-
tion working, through time, through the depoliticization of contestation 
and conflict. When a ‘gift’ is rejected or resisted, it is not because it was 
inappropriate, poorly considered or detrimental to people’s wellbeing, 
but because Malagasy peasants are variably ignorant, ungrateful, 
greedy, unreasonable or stubborn. When depoliticization is not suffi-
cient and dissent cannot be ignored, QMM resorts to the use of state 
police and military forces, legal manoeuvring, strategic pay-outs and 
blocking speech against the mine. Crucially, as in the example of 
economically dispossessed residents of Antsotso, QMM blurs the lines 
between the public and private spheres embodied in the partnership 
itself in order to create jurisdictional confusion among claimants around 
ruined livelihoods and poor compensation. While not all of these ma-
neuvers are always mutually beneficial or agreed upon among parties to 
partnership, territorial control, social control and revenue generation 
create a constellation shared interest. Consequently, the alliance – the 
‘real’ QMM – is much stronger than the sum of its parts. 
Multinational mining companies, including Rio Tinto subsidiaries 
(see for example Kapelus, 2002; O’Connor & Montoya, 2010), often rely 
on social technologies like community engagement, environmental 
projects, social programs, and infrastructure development under CSR 
directives as the proverbial ‘carrot’ to subdue opposition alongside more 
visible and direct forms of ‘hard’ violence (Lasslett, 2014; Rosenau, 
Chalk, McPherson, Parker, & Long, 2009). While these are part of 
corporate counterinsurgency tactics, the broadened approach to pacifi-
cation helps account for the fact that the violence of enacting security 
and order often defies the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ dichotomy. Rather, the range 
of social technologies, policing powers, social violence and military 
force involved in pacification, now as in the past, are better considered 
as aspects or dimensions of the unity of imperialist class violence or 
‘social war’ (Baron et al., 2019; Dunlap, this issue; Neocleous & Rigakos, 
2011, p. 16). 
Making the ‘order’ of the world more visible, as we have said, reveals 
that the violence of the ‘state of exception’ is in fact unexceptional, 
normal and permanent in relation to the operation of power (Agamben, 
2005; Foucault, 2003, pp. 61–62; Neocleous & Rigakos, 2011, 2013; 
Mbemb�e, 2003; Neocleous, 2006; Springer, 2012). This idea helps to 
underscore the fact that violence is not natural, senseless or inevitable. It 
is, rather, political, relational and contextual. Its instruments can be 
conventional weapons or the invisible weapons of coercion, represen-
tation and exclusion that operate through vast disparities in power. In 
the QMM case, these involve promises unfulfilled, disinformation, 
inducement of hunger, political exclusion, neglect, threat, gaslighting, 
dispossession and social disarticulation that shape the challenges people 
encounter, the choices people can make and the forms that ‘reactions 
from below’ such as resistance and refusal can take. 
7. Conclusions 
‘Security’, and likewise ‘development’ and ‘sustainability’ are 
powerful constructs, fundamental to the logics, interests and imagi-
naries that make up the ‘high politics’ of natural resource policy and 
governance. Each of these terms is normatively associated with liberal 
social values, assumptions about relationships between formal in-
stitutions and society, and universalized ‘positive’ policy aspirations. 
Yet, all three are ‘slippery’ and contested. Much of the ‘slipperiness’ and 
contestation around them is a consequence of contradictions between 
the way in which they can be depoliticized in high-level discourse and 
instrumentalized in policy on one hand, and the ways in which they 
shape everyday politics and manifest in practice ‘on the ground’ on the 
other. As the QMM case demonstrates, it cannot be taken for granted 
that what is ‘secured’, ‘developed’ or ‘sustained’ is a stable nor a socially, 
economically and environmentally just, political order (Dalby, 1992). 
In this paper, we have shown how re-thinking ‘resource warfare’ 
through an expanded conceptualization of pacification can bring polit-
ical ecology’s approach to the politics of nature, resources and devel-
opment more firmly into dialogue with central concerns in political 
geography, critical security studies and research on geographies of 
violence. This approach can open up understandings of emerging ge-
ographies of resource control, violence and conflict in ways that move 
beyond and against the depoliticization and hegemony of the dominant 
security discourse. Rather, they can facilitate a deeper understanding 
how global drivers of investment and enclosure enmesh complex, situ-
ated and intersecting politics of violence, space and place in the engi-
neering of extractive landscapes. 
Pacification is violence that, when it operates effectively, appears as 
the absence of violence. This is because it is productive of the things we 
recognize not just as security, order or peace, but also as forms of sus-
tainability, development or progress that appeal to liberal social values 
but that are nonetheless laden with contradiction. As an analytic tool, 
the conceptualization of pacification that we present can help us see how 
moments of ‘violent rupture’ are not simply aberrations in a world of 
order (Baron et al., 2019, p. 10), but rather are moments in which the 
violence of the order of the world can become more visible. This includes 
security and development architectures that are built on the sedimented 
logics and technologies of past regimes of value extraction, including 
racism, ecological domination and techniques of social warfare. Logics 
of pacification work as means of connection, ‘threads’ that connect 
places, actors, ideas and social technologies through time and space and 
make ‘engineering extraction’ possible. To paraphrase Butler (2009: 29), 
when considering historical circumstances, there is no way to separate 
the materiality of violence and domination from the representational 
and productive regimes that give rise to it, through which it operates, 
and which give it legitimacy. 
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